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Even though language allows us to say exactly what we mean, we
often use language to say things indirectly, in a way that depends on
the speciﬁc communicative context. For example, we can use an ap-
parently straightforward sentence like “It is hard to give a good pres-
entation” to convey deeper meanings, like “Your talk was a mess!”
One of the big puzzles in language science is how listeners work out
what speakers really mean, which is a skill absolutely central to
communication. However, most neuroimaging studies of language
comprehension have focused on the arguably much simpler, context-
independent process of understanding direct utterances. To examine
the neural systems involved in getting at contextually constrained in-
direct meaning, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging as
people listened to indirect replies in spoken dialog. Relative to direct
control utterances, indirect replies engaged dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, right temporo-parietal junction and insula, as well as bilateral
inferior frontal gyrus and right medial temporal gyrus. This suggests
that listeners take the speaker’s perspective on both cognitive
(theory of mind) and affective (empathy-like) levels. In line with
classic pragmatic theories, our results also indicate that currently
popular “simulationist” accounts of language comprehension fail to
explain how listeners understand the speaker’s intended message.
Keywords: communication, fMRI, indirect replies, speaker meaning, theory
of mind
Introduction
According to standard views of linguistic meaning, there is a
context-invariant “sentence meaning” (coded meaning), which
can be computed by retrieving relatively stable word meanings
from lexical memory and by combining them in a grammati-
cally constrained higher-order representation. Pragmatic ac-
counts of language comprehension (e.g. Grice 1975),
however, point out that the result of such lexicon- and
grammar-driven sense making is actually an incomplete rep-
resentation of the meaning of an utterance. Our everyday con-
versations seem to be full of remarks with a meaning that
critically hinges on the linguistic and social context in which
they are embedded. Thus, the simple phrase “The cat is on the
mat” can, depending on the circumstances, be interpreted as
“Can you ﬁnally get up and open the door?”; The question “Are
you going to wear that tie?” is likely to result in another trip to
the wardrobe; and a student hearing her teacher’s statement
“It’s hard to give a good presentation” will probably infer that
her talk might not have been a success after all. Interpreting
the speaker’s message (speaker meaning) requires, among
other things, mechanisms for contextual disambiguation and
for recovering implicit meanings that the speaker meant to
convey in a particular context. It is precisely here that recent
proposals in the neurobiology of language which claim that
comprehension is based on sensory-motor simulation of the
coded meaning (Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004) will very likely
be insufﬁcient.
This highly relevant distinction between coded meaning
and speaker meaning suggests that a full account of the neuro-
biology of language must extend beyond systems for coding
and decoding words and phrases. While they constitute a
necessary point of departure, our understanding of how the
brain supports natural communication will simply not be com-
plete without grasping the neural machinery of speaker
meaning comprehension. Brain imaging studies on metaphors
or idioms (e.g. Mashal et al. 2007) go some way toward exam-
ining the processing of language “beyond the literal code.”
However, metaphors and idioms are in a way still relatively
strongly tied to the code, in that they yield their “speaker
meaning” independently of the particular communicative
context and speaker (Holtgraves 1999). For many everyday
utterances, including various forms of indirectness, the
speaker meaning does critically depend on the particular
context in which utterances are embedded. To study those, we
need experimental paradigms in which the listener has to infer
the speaker’s informative intent by relying not only on the lin-
guistic signal (as in studies on metaphor and idiom), but also
on the wider discourse and social context in which the utter-
ance serves its communicative purpose.
In the present research, we focus on the neural machinery
involved in the interpretation of speaker meaning. As a test
case, we contrasted direct and indirect replies—2 classes of
utterances whose speaker meanings are either very similar to,
or markedly different from, their coded meaning. In our study,
participants listened to natural spoken dialog in which the
ﬁnal and critical utterance, for example, “It is hard to give a
good presentation,” had different meanings depending on the
dialog context and the immediately preceding question. This
critical utterance either served as a direct reply (to the question
“How hard is it to give a good presentation?”), or as an indirect
reply (to “Did you like my presentation?” or to “Will you give a
presentation (rather than a poster) at the conference?”). One of
the major motivations for speakers to reply indirectly in con-
versations is to mutually protect one another’s public self or
“face” (e.g. Goffman 1967; Brown and Levinson 1987; Holt-
graves 1999). Half of our indirect utterances represented such
emotionally charged face-saving situations, involving excuses,
polite refusals, or attempts not to offend the person asking the
question. The other half of the indirect replies represented
more neutral situations, in which the speaker’s motivation for
indirectness was simply to provide more information than just
a simple “no.” Common to both indirect conditions was the
fact that the preceding question set up a strong expectation for
a yes/no answer, which was not met by a literal reading of the
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indirect reply. Furthermore, and illustrated by the above
example, the target utterances were identical (i.e., had the
same linguistic “code”) in all 3 conditions, so that any differ-
ences between the direct and indirect replies must be due to
neural processes involved in speaker meaning computation.
The most inﬂuential theoretical accounts of speaker
meaning interpretation stress its inferential nature (Grice 1975;
Sperber and Wilson 1995; Levinson 2000; Wilson and Sperber
2004). In essence, listeners presume that speakers tailor their
utterances to be optimally relevant for the present communica-
tive situation, and any obvious departures from this relevance
send the listener looking for hidden meanings. In other words,
coded meaning is just a point of departure for the recovery of
the actual speaker’s message. In the interpretive process, lis-
teners must also take into account information drawn from
various contextual sources. These include the shared speaker–
listener goals and their perspectives on the communicative
situation, which has been established in the previous utter-
ances. Hence, we expect that, relative to direct replies, inter-
preting indirect replies will require mentalistic inferences
about the speaker’s intention behind uttering a seemingly irre-
levant piece of information in response to a yes/no question.
At the neurobiological level, this inferential network would
most likely recruit some of the regions typically involved in
tasks on reasoning about the mental states of others, such as
the medial frontal/prefrontal cortex, the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ), and bilateral anterior temporal lobes (Frith and
Frith 2003; Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Amodio and Frith 2006;
Mitchell et al. 2006; Saxe 2006). Since the communicated
meaning of indirect replies also depends on nonmentalistic in-
ferences involving the situation model established in the prior
discourse, we expect that the comprehension of indirect
replies will also draw on regions in the brain that support text-
and discourse-level situation model processing, beyond the
classic language network (Xu et al. 2005; Ferstl et al. 2008). A
brain region typically involved in such contextual anchoring is
the right inferior frontal gyrus (RIFG; Menenti et al. 2009).
With respect to the 2 different types of indirect replies,
we expect that they will both engage a common set of
regions, since the interpretation of both requires contextual
anchoring of the utterance as well as taking the speaker’s
perspective into account. In addition, we hypothesize that,
due to their social–emotional connotations, listening to
face-saving indirect replies will engage socio-cognitive
and/or affect-related brain structures, such as the amygdala,
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; e.g. Dalgleish 2004),
insula (Fan et al. 2011), or the anterior/inferior temporal
lobe (Binder and Desai 2011).
An inﬂuential alternative to the inferential view of language
comprehension is inspired by the discovery of the mirror
neurons and often referred to as the “simulationist” view. The
“simulationist” view states that comprehension does not
require any inferential steps, but can work by virtue of simu-
lation, or automatic sensorimotor processes, creating a
common semantic link between the speaker and the addressee
(Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004). Critically, the implicit assump-
tion here is that it is the coded meaning of the utterance that is
simulated, which is in contrast with the above view that gives a
central place to linguistic and socio-cognitive inferences. The
simulation is thought to be accomplished by means of the
human mirror-neuron system, presumably located in the occi-
pital, temporal, and parietal visual regions, as well as the
inferior parietal lobule, the precentral gyrus, and area 44 of the
inferior frontal gyrus (e.g. Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Iacoboni 1999;
Buccino et al. 2001; Iacoboni et al. 2001).
In the domain of understanding language, the putative
mirror-neuron system has been argued to be implicated in, for
example, action word comprehension (see e.g. Pulvermüller
and Fadiga 2010), but also when people interpreted the
message conveyed by communicative gestures during a game
of charades (Schippers et al. 2009). However, this proposal has
never been tested at such a high level of meaning processing,
in the computation of speaker meaning. Since deriving
speaker meaning is such an essential aspect of human com-
munication, it is crucial that alternative views on the necessary
neurobiological infrastructure for language comprehension no
longer ignore neuropragmatic aspects of language. Here, we
focus on the neural machinery involved in the recovery of
speaker meaning. As part of that, we will explore whether this
interpretation process is inferential in nature, or whether un-
derstanding of communicative messages takes place via
inference-free simulation of coded meaning of the speaker’s
utterance. In our study, participants were listening to dialogs
between 2 people while their blood oxygen level-dependent
(BOLD) signals were acquired in the MR scanner. In one con-
dition, the answer that the second person provided was a
direct reply to the question of the ﬁrst person. In the other con-
ditions, the same answer was an indirect reply to another ques-
tion by the ﬁrst person. We only contrasted the activation to
the same answers in the different reply modes.
Results
The crucial comparison for the issue at stake is the one
between same sentences in their role as indirect versus direct
replies. Listening to replies whose meaning was indirect in
contrast to replies with a more direct meaning activated a large
frontal and medial prefrontal network, including bilateral
superior medial frontal gyrus, right supplementary motor area
(SMA), and parts of the inferior frontal gyrus (pars orbitalis
and pars triangularis) bilaterally, extending into the insula in
the left hemisphere (see Fig. 1; for exact coordinates, see
Table 1). In addition, the right TPJ and the right middle tem-
poral gyrus showed an increased activation. To disentangle
the relative contribution of the 2 types of indirect replies, we
performed several additional analyses. Interpreting the face-
saving replies activated a network of regions largely overlap-
ping with the the overall comparison between indirect and
direct replies. For this comparison, medial frontal cortex (MFC)
activation included the left ACC, and an additional activation
cluster was present in the right superior temporal gyrus (STG;
Supplementary Material, Supplementary Fig. 1B). When we ex-
cluded the face-saving indirect replies, still a signiﬁcant subset
of the regions from the pooled comparison remained active:
The right TPJ, left insula, as well as bilateral inferior frontal
gyrus: Pars orbitalis in the right hemisphere and pars triangu-
laris in the left hemisphere. An additional activation was seen
in the left temporal pole (Supplementary Fig. 1A).
Finally, a direct comparison of processing triggered by the
face-saving indirect replies in comparison to the informative
indirect replies revealed a number of clusters in the right hemi-
sphere, of which the largest ones were in STG and the ACC.
Once again, there was a cluster spanning the RIFG and anterior
insula, although this time it was only marginally signiﬁcant, at
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P < 0.10 (Supplementary Fig. 2). Results and ﬁgures from the
conjunction analysis of the 2 indirect effects are presented in
Supplementary Material (Supplementary Figs 3 and 4).
Discussion
The main goal of this study was to identify brain regions in-
volved in language comprehension at a level of representation
typically overlooked in the neurobiology of language research:
The intended meaning a speaker wants to communicate with a
speciﬁc utterance, also known as speaker meaning (Grice
1957). Participants listened to utterances that were identical at
the word and sentence level, but they were used to express
different informative intentions. This allowed us to isolate pro-
cessing related to speaker meaning interpretation beyond the
retrieval of individual word meanings, sentence-level semantic
composition, or even low-level pragmatic enrichment, such as
ﬁxing the referents of pronouns. We have shown that deriving
the speaker’s communicative intention depends on several
brain regions previously implicated in mentalizing and
empathy (MFC, right TPJ, and the anterior insula) as well as in
discourse-level language processing (bilateral prefrontal cortex
and right temporal regions). Moreover, we have shown that
when the speaker meaning has affective implications, a
number of right-lateralized regions get involved. These regions
are previously implicated not only in affective and social-
cognitive processing (insula and ACC), but also in building and
maintaining a coherent representation of what is going on in
the discourse (IFG and STG).
In the indirectness effect (comprising both types of indirect
replies against a direct-reply baseline), there were activations
in the MFC extending into the right anterior part of the SMA,
and in the right TPJ, a pattern typical for tasks that involve
higher-order, theory-of-mind (ToM)-like mentalizing (Amodio
and Frith 2006; Mitchell et al. 2006; Saxe et al. 2006). Although
the exact role of all the individual ToM regions is not yet
clearly established, both MFC and right TPJ constitute core
regions activated across various input modalities (such as in
cartoons or auditory presented stories) and in both verbal and
nonverbal tasks (Carrington and Bailey 2009) in ToM research.
The most speciﬁc hypothesis about the role of the right TPJ in
the mentalizing network is that it is implicated in mental-state
reasoning, that is, thinking about other people’s beliefs,
emotions, and desires (Saxe 2010). Activation in the right TPJ
has been also shown to correlate with autistic spectrum dis-
order syndrome severity in a self-other mental-state reasoning
task (Lombardo et al. 2011).
An MFC cortex is a large cortical region with a variety of
roles characteristic of social cognition in general, beyond ToM
processing (Amodio and Frith 2006; Saxe and Powell 2006).
Based on a meta-analysis of task-related activations from this
region, Amodio and Frith (2006) proposed a division of the
MFC into 3 distinct functional and anatomical regions with
different connections to the rest of the brain. The peaks of our
activation, although fairly close to each other, fall in the
anterior and posterior rostral divisions, which are associated
with complex socio-cognitive processes such as mentalizing or
thinking about the intentions of others (such as communica-
tive intentions and right anterior MFC) or oneself (right pos-
terior MFC). Interestingly, the involvement of these regions is
not exclusive to ToM tasks, but is consistently observed in the
narrative comprehension literature (e.g. Mason and Just 2009;
Mar 2011). This is not surprising, as it is likely that the motiv-
ations, goals, and desires of ﬁctional characters are accessed in
a similar manner as with real-life protagonists (Mar and Oatley
2008). In fact, an inﬂuential model from the discourse proces-
sing literature (Mason and Just 2009) ascribes the dorsomedial
part of the frontal cortex and the right TPJ a functional role as a
protagonist perspective network, which generates expec-
tations about how the protagonists of stories will act based on
understanding their intentions.
In the context of speaker meaning interpretation, the fact
that we found activation in these 2 brain regions typically in-
volved in social cognition suggests that listeners engage in
nonlinguistic perspective taking in order to fully comprehend
the meaning of the indirect replies. Just as theoretical accounts
suggest (e.g. Grice 1975), getting at the speaker’s intended
message means that the listener considers not only the
Figure 1. Activations for the main effect of indirectness. Signiﬁcant effects are displayed on cortical renderings and on axial slices (z coordinate levels in millimeters).
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meanings of her words, but also what was her motivation and
what goal she wanted to achieve when she uttered these words
in both the speciﬁc linguistic and social context.
The general comparison of direct and indirect replies also
engaged the left insula, a region known to be involved in
empathy and affective processing (Singer and Lamm 2009;
Berntson et al. 2011). One plausible explanation of anterior
insula involvement in deriving speaker meaning is that it pro-
vides a low-level form of perspective taking (see also Ruby and
Decety 2001), the outcome of which then might be “relayed”
to higher-level mentalizing processes. This interpretation of
insula involvement is supported by a recent meta-analysis of
studies involving a wide variety of empathy-invoking stimuli
and tasks (Fan et al. 2011), which found a division of labor in
the anterior insula based on laterality, with the left insula im-
plicated in both affective–perceptual and cognitive–evaluative
forms of empathy. Taken together, this suggests that speaker
meaning interpretation requires 2 types of nonlinguistic per-
spective taking: A more reasoning-based perspective taking
(“What does the protagonist think?”) and a more experiential,
affective appreciation of “how does it feel to be the protago-
nist.” [The “face-saving effect” revealed in the contrast between
face-saving and informative indirect replies is further discussed
in Supplementary Material (Supplementary Fig. 6).]
Also involved in recovering the meaning of indirect replies
were parts of the perisylvian language network in the left
inferior frontal gyrus (Brodmann area 45 [BA45] and 47) and
their right-hemispheric homologs. The left IFG plays a promi-
nent role in language processing (Price 2000), from sentence-
level processes such as semantic uniﬁcation of lexical infor-
mation (Hagoort et al. 2009) to linking causally related sen-
tences when reading texts (Kuperberg et al. 2006). Text
comprehension research suggests that regions within the bilat-
eral IFG might support the semantic selection of inferential
information (Mason and Just 2011). In addition, the right IFG
seems to be particularly related to constructing a situation
model based on linguistic and nonlinguistic inputs (Menenti
et al. 2009). This interpretation of IFG function is consistent
with the fact that the meaning of indirect replies is crucially de-
pendent on the linguistic and social details of the context they
are embedded in.
Simulation or Inference?
One inﬂuential view on how language comprehension is
implemented in the brain is the simulationist view, endorsing
the existence of direct, automatic, cognitively unmediated sen-
sorimotor resonance processes that establish common seman-
tic links between the speaker and listener (Rizzolatti and
Craighero 2004). On the neural level, these are supposedly
implemented in the brain regions that contain mirror neurons
or have mirror properties. A crucial assumption is that listeners
re-enact the coded meaning of utterances, and there is no place
for linguistic or nonlinguistic (such as mentalizing) inferential
processes in this model. Although this approach might be able
to explain language comprehension at a single word level, our
results show that such reasoning “cannot be the whole story” if
we consider higher levels of meaning.
Only 2 brain regions from the comparison between direct
and indirect replies, the insula and SMA, can be considered
part of the simulation network, and there are alternative ac-
counts for both of them (Picard and Strick 2001; Saxe 2005,
2009; Decety 2010). Even if we accept their role as “mirroring”
components of our speaker meaning interpretation network,
they clearly need the support of other language and
mentalizing-related regions, which is not consistent with a
“cognitively unmediated” explanation of language comprehen-
sion. Thus, we conclude that language comprehension in its
most typical niche—in rich social contexts—goes beyond
simulating coded meanings of words and sentences.
While our results speak against a simple sensorimotor, or
mirror-neuron type of simulation, we cannot rule out that
Table 1
Activations for contrasts of interest thresholded at 0.001
Anatomical region Coordinates of local
maxima
BA Cluster
size
P-value (cluster-level
FWE corrected)
x y z
Pooled indirect replies > direct replies
R supplementary
motor area
14 24 58 8 1641 <0.001
L middle frontal
medial gyrus
−4 42 28 32
R middle frontal
medial gyrus
8 36 50 8
R inferior frontal
gyrus
34 22 −12 47/49 1592 <0.001
44 30 −4 47
R inferior frontal
gyrus
58 22 4 47
L anterior insula −30 16 −14 15 1381 <0.001
L inferior frontal
gyrus
−58 22 10 47
L inferior frontal
gyrus
−52 38 −6 47
R temporo-parietal
junction
48 −50 32 39/40 375 0.003
R middle temporal
gyrus
52 −28 −6 21 248 0.022
62 −30 −2 21
Indirect informative replies > direct replies
L temporal pole −36 16 −20 38 472 0.001
L inferior frontal gyrus −52 20 6 47
L anterior insula −28 20 −4 13/15
R temporo-parietal
junction
48 −50 32 39/40 281 0.011
R inferior frontal gyrus
(pars orbitalis)
38 22 −12 47/49 189 0.049
Indirect face-saving replies > direct replies
R anterior cingulate
cortex
6 44 16 24/32 2137 <0.001
R supplementary
motor area
14 24 58 8
R superior medial
cortex
10 34 56 8
R anterior insula 34 20 −12 15 1958 <0.001
R inferior frontal
gyrus (pars orbitalis)
48 28 −4 47
R inferior frontal
gyrus
60 20 16 45
L anterior insula −32 16 −14 15 1295 <0.001
L inferior frontal
gyrus (pars triangularis)
−58 24 8 45
R superior temporal
gyrus
58 −22 2 22 763 <0.001
64 −28 0 21/22
R middle temporal
gyrus
54 −28 −4 21
R temporo-parietal
junction
50 −50 32 39/40 247 0.030
Indirect face-saving replies > indirect informative replies
R superior temporal
gyrus
56 −20 4 41/42/22 1011 <0.001
50 −26 8 41/42/22
56 −6 −8 22
R anterior cingulate
cortex
6 48 18 32 414 0.002
R inferior frontal
gyrus (pars orbitalis)
44 26 −14 47 166 0.091
R anterior insula 32 20 −16 15
Note: Cluster P-values are corrected for multiple nonindependent comparisons. All reported
coordinates are in the MNI space. BA, Brodmann area; FWE, family-wise error.
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language comprehension depends partly on a more complex
form of simulation. There are currently simulationist positions
in which simulation is based on the recognition and assessing
of the intentions of others (e.g. Goldman 2006, 2009), as well
as a recent model of language production and comprehension
where both of these processes depend on simulating the
speaker’s intentions (Pickering and Garrod forthcoming).
What these richer simulationist accounts have in common is
that even though they endorse simple mirroring as a mechan-
ism playing part in action/language comprehension, it is not
the sole mechanism of comprehension.
In conclusion, we have presented evidence suggesting that
meaning interpretation in communication is fundamentally in-
ferential in nature, with a critical role in arriving at the in-
tended meaning of the speaker’s message played by linguistic
and mentalizing inferences. These results are in direct opposi-
tion to the view that comprehension can be accomplished by
direct, cognitively unmediated “simulation” of the coded
meaning of speakers’ utterances. Instead, we suggest that lis-
teners take the speaker’s perspective at both cognitive (ToM)
and affective (empathy-like) levels.
Experimental Procedures
Participants
Twenty-eight native speakers of Dutch participated in the
experiment (5 males, mean age 21.2 years, SD = 2.67). Three
additional subjects were excluded from the analysis because of
excessive head movement during scanning. All participants
were right-handed and had no history of neurological impair-
ment or head injury. They all signed an informed consent form
and received payment or course credits.
Stimulus Material
We created 90 critical utterances that were preceded by 3
different types of context, making up 270 experimental items
in total. There were 3 experimental conditions in the study. De-
pending on the preceding context, each critical utterance
could be interpreted as either a direct reply (condition 1) or an
indirect reply (conditions 2 and 3). While one of the indirect
conditions was purely informative, the other involved a socio-
emotional aspect, as the reason for indirectness was to “save
one’s face” (as in excuses or polite refusals). Thus, the speaker
meaning was either explicitly stated and largely corresponded
to the sentence-level meaning of the critical utterance (direct),
or, in both indirect conditions (informative, face-saving), the
speaker’s message was implicit and a pragmatic inference was
necessary to recover it. A small number of the indirect replies
were adapted from Holtgraves (1999).
The structure of each item was as follows: A lead-in story set
up the relevant context, introducing the 2 lead characters and
any necessary background (e.g. where they are, what they are
doing, what their goals are). After that, the characters held a
short 4-turn dialog culminating in the critical question-reply
pair. Across the 3 conditions, the critical utterance (reply) was
always the same. Thus, we had 2 types of context: A wider
background (lead-in story) as well as the immediate context
(critical question). Table 2 provides an example of the stimulus
materials (for a detailed description of how the stimuli were
constructed, see Supplementary Material).
In addition, there were 55 ﬁller items. The purpose of the
ﬁller items was 2-fold: First, approximately two-thirds of the ﬁnal
utterances of the ﬁller dialogs were more explicit than the criti-
cal utterances, containing yes/no and similar expressions. Sec-
ondly, after 50 of the ﬁller items, participants had to answer a
visually presented true/false statement with a button press. A
correct reply required them to process the ﬁller item for its
implicit meaning. No other task demands were imposed. Two
ﬁller items were presented as example items before the actual
experiment, and one ﬁller item was used to adjust the sound
level for each participant before each scanning session.
All items were presented auditorily. The lead-in stories were
narrated by a female Dutch speaker. The dialogs were recorded
by 80 male and female Dutch native speakers. We chose the
speakers with respect to the age and sex of the dialogs’ protago-
nists, and each speaker recorded 3 dialogs on average. Each
dialog was recorded several times in order to choose the best
version. The recordings were edited in Praat (Boersma 2001),
and 2 native Dutch speakers then jointly chose the best record-
ing for each of the 3 conditions.
Procedure
The study consisted of 2 sessions lasting approximately 1.5 h
each, on 2 different days. One session comprised 2 experimen-
tal blocks, the other 3 experimental blocks, with counterba-
lanced order of presentation. Each experimental block
consisted of 18 critical items and 11 ﬁller items. There was a
short break after each block.
Participants received written instructions before the exper-
iment, asking them to listen to the stories and dialogs. They
were asked to pay special attention to “what the protagonists
really wanted to say” with their ﬁnal utterances and were re-
minded that this “speaker’s message” is, in light of the context,
Table 2
Examples of the 3 different types of replies, preceded by their respective context stories,
translated into English
Direct reply
John needs to earn some extra course points. One of the possibilities is to attend a student
conference. He has never been to a conference before, and he has to decide whether he wants to
present a poster, or give a 15-min oral presentation. He is talking to his friend Robert, who has
more experience with conferences. John knows that Robert will be realistic about how much work
it takes to prepare for a conference.
J: How is it to prepare a poster?
R: A nice poster is not so easy to prepare.
J: And how about a presentation?
R: It’s hard to give a good presentation.
Indirect informative reply
John and Robert are following a course in Philosophy. It is almost the end of the semester. The
lecturer has announced that they can either write a paper, or give a presentation about a
philosopher of their choice. Both John and Robert are ambitious students and want to get good
grades. They know that they want to talk about postmodern philosophers, but they are not yet sure
about the format. They are discussing their possibilities.
J: I think that I will rather write a paper.
R: I agree, you are a very good writer.
J: Will you choose a presentation?
R: It’s hard to give a good presentation.
Indirect face-saving reply
John and Robert are following a course in Philosophy. It is the last lesson of the semester, and
everybody has to turn in their assignments. Some people have written a paper, and others have
given a presentation about a philosopher of their choice. John has chosen the latter. When the
lesson is over, he is talking to Robert.
J: I’m relieved it’s over!
R: Yes, the lecturer was really strict.
J: Did you ﬁnd my presentation convincing?
R: It’s hard to give a good presentation.
The target utterance is always the ﬁnal one (in bold italics).
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sometimes similar and at other times different than the actual
words the protagonists are using. The instructions also con-
tained 3 example items.
Each stimulus was preceded by a ﬁxation cross for 2 s. The
lead-in story was then presented in stereo via headphones.
After the last sentence of the story, the names of the 2 protago-
nists depicted in the story were displayed on the screen for
another 2 s, one on the left and another on the right. The left/
right assignment corresponded to the direction from which the
participant heard the particular speaker during the dialog, to
ease protagonist identiﬁcation. During the entire dialog, a ﬁx-
ation cross was in the middle of the screen and remained there
for another 4 s after the end of target utterance.
Each participant heard 145 stories and dialogs in total.
Because each target critical utterance was presented only once
to a single participant, we constructed 3 stimulus lists.
We matched the 3 conditions within each list as closely as
possible on the following characteristics: Length of each target
utterance (in seconds) and length of the preceding context (in
words), lexical frequencies of the content words in the critical
utterances based on frequency counts from the Spoken Dutch
Corpus [corpus gesproken Nederlands e.g. Oostdijk 2000], se-
mantic similarity of the context stories and dialogs up to the
target utterance, and ﬁnally the amount of direct semantic
priming (repetition of the same content words) from the lead-in
story and from the critical question. Each list was pseudorando-
mized, with no more than 2 items from the same condition ap-
pearing after each other.
The block order, Left/Right assignment of the speakers, and
TRUE/FALSE button assignment in the task were counterba-
lanced across participants.
Task
On 50 of the ﬁller items, participants had to answer a true/false
statement. The statement could only be answered correctly if
participants paid attention to the speakers’ message, which
was mostly not explicitly stated.
The statements were presented visually after the last sen-
tence of the dialog and stayed on the screen until the partici-
pants had responded by pressing the left or right button with
their left or right index ﬁnger.
fMRI Data Acquisition
Participants were scanned in an ascending fashion with a
Siemens 3-T Tim-Trio MRI-scanner, using a 8-channel surface
coil. The repetition time (TR) was 2.4 s and each volume con-
sisted of 35 slices of 3-mm thickness with a 17% slice gap. The
voxel size was 3.5 × 3.5 × 3 mm3, and the ﬁeld of view was 224
mm. Functional scans were acquired at echo time (TE) = 30 ms.
Flip angle was 80°. Awhole-brain high-resolution structural T1-
-weigthed GRAPPA sequence was performed to characterize
participants’ anatomy (TR = 2300 ms, TE = 3.03 ms, 192 slices
with voxel size of 1 mm3, ﬁeld of view = 256).
fMRI Data Analysis
The functional magnetic resonace imaging (fMRI) data were
preprocessed and analyzed using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM5, ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The ﬁrst 5 images
in each session were discarded to prevent a transient nonsa-
turation effect from affecting the analysis. The functional
echo-planar imaging-BOLD images were then realigned and
slice-time corrected. The resulting functional images were
coregistered to the participants’ anatomical volume based on
the subject-mean functional image, normalized to MNI
space, and spatially smoothed using a 3-dimensional isotro-
pic Gaussian smoothing kernel (full-width half-maximum = 8
mm). A temporal high-pass ﬁlter was applied with a cycle
cutoff at 128 s.
In the ﬁrst-level linear model, we modeled the onsets and
durations of the 3 types of the target utterances (direct, indirect
face-saving, and indirect informative), which were deﬁned as
the entire conversational turn, including the short preutterance
silence. Each of the conditions included 30 trials. We also
modeled the onset and duration of the visually presented 2 s
ﬁxation cross before each experimental item (baseline), as well
as the 4-s ﬁxation cross after the end of the target utterance.
The regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic
response function, and the realignment parameters were in-
cluded in the model to correct for subject movement during
scanning. Subsequently, various images were deﬁned for
each participant and used in the second-level random effects
analysis.
In the second-level random effects analysis, we used the
contrast images of interest in a repeated-measures analysis of
variance. The cluster size was used as the test statistic, and only
clusters signiﬁcant at P < 0.05 corrected for multiple noninde-
pendent comparisons are reported. The initial threshold was
0.001 at the voxel level.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material can be found at: http://www.cercor.
oxfordjournals.org/
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